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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Experimental Evidence that 
Retaliation Claims Are 
Unlike Other Employment 
Discrimination Claims
The type of  discrimination claim that strikes fear in the hearts of  all employers is the dreaded retaliation claim. While employers contend, and plaintiffs admit, that retaliation is different from other discrimination complaints, employee advocates have put forth legislation that would equalize retaliation with the other types of  discrimination. This bill, Protecting Older Workers 
against Discrimination Act (POWADA), would expand the so-called mixed-motive jury instruction to age, 
and disability, as well as retaliation. Moreover, it would allow plaintiffs, not judges, to decide which types of  
instruction the jury would receive. In this article, the authors argue that retaliation claims should not receive 
the same treatment as other discrimination claims (including age and disability), because it’s easy for juries to 
believe that retaliation is a factor, regardless of  other facts. Once a fact-finding jury checks the box to indicate 
that an employer’s motive might include retaliation, the employer will likely have to pay fees and costs, at 
minimum, regardless of  the claim’s final resolution. 
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I love retaliation; it’s in the Bible and people get it.*
  * Wayne Outten, Managing Partner, Outten & Golden, LLP, Remarks at New York University’s 62nd Annual Conference on Labor and Employment Law 
Initiatives and Proposals in the Obama Administration (June 5, 2009).
2  Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor and Employment Law • The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
David Sherwyn, J.D., is the John and Melissa Ceriale Professor of Hospitality and Human Resources at the 
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration; 
Zev J. Eigen, J.D., is the chair of the Data Analytics Department at Littler. 
We thank Professors Dawn Chutkow and Michael Heise, and Daniel Saperstein (Proskauer 
Rose, LLP), and Danielle Cara Newman (Cornell Law School, Class of 2015) for their input on 
earlier drafts and for outstanding research assistance.
Cornell Hospitality Report • August 2016 • www.chr.cornell.edu • Vol. 16, No. 19 3
CORNELL HOSPITALITY REPORT
CORNELL HOSPITALITY LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT
David Sherwyn and Zev J. Eigen
Experimental Evidence that Retaliation 
Claims Are Unlike Other Employment 
Discrimination Claims
Proposed legislation in the U.S. Congress would add discrimination based on age and disability to the other categories which cannot be a motivation for an employer’s hiring decision. However, the legislation also includes another cause, retaliation, which we argue is an entirely different type of  situation. We further propose that including retaliation in this category will 
have the unanticipated outcome of  forcing employers to avoid counseling or working with struggling 
employees. Generally, there should be little concern with employment legislation being passed, but there are 
two reasons why this general belief  may no longer hold. First, there is political upheaval going on, and the 
rules of  politics seem to be changing as we speak. Second, the legislation regarding retaliation is attached to 
a bill addressing age discrimination, in which the vast majority of  Congress has a vested interest. The purpose 
of  this paper is to explain the two types of  discrimination standards and to demonstrate that retaliation 
should be treated differently from other claims. 
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Prior to the CRA of  1991, an employer motivated by race, color, 
sex, national origin, or religion, but who would have made the 
decision regardless of  the protected class, is not guilty and is not 
liable for any damages. After the CRA of  1991, such an employ-
er is liable for discrimination and associated attorneys’ fees and 
costs, but not any other damages.9 Alternatively, an employer 
motivated by age, disability, or retaliation, but who would have 
made the decision anyway is still not liable for discrimination nor 
associated costs and fees. The question is whether retaliation 
in Title VII cases is different than underlying Title VII claims. 
This article contends that it is.
To test our claim we replicated and slightly modified a prior 
jury experiment conducted in 2010, by substituting a retaliation 
claim for a national origin employment discrimination claim in 
an otherwise unchanged employment discrimination fact pat-
tern.10 Just over 40 percent of  the mock jurors in the 2010 study 
were persuaded by an employee’s claim that national origin 
motivated an employer’s adverse action.11 In the instant experi-
ment, almost 60 percent of  the mock jurors were persuaded by a 
retaliation claim (holding constant the other salient parts of  the 
fact pattern from the prior study).12 Simply altering the nature of  
the employment discrimination claims (national origin versus re-
taliation) likely explains at least some of  the observed increased 
likelihood of  jurors’ concluding that the complaining employee 
successfully established a viable legal claim. If  this is so, then 
extending mixed-motive jury instructions to include retaliation 
claims, as contemplated by POWADA, is unlikely to resolve key 
problems challenging employment law doctrine and, worse still, 
may exacerbate other problems.
In the next section, we discuss the law of  employer retalia-
tion and distinguish retaliation claims from those of  other pro-
tected employee classes. Following that, we present the results of  
our jury study in which we seek to experimentally assess the con-
sequences of  applying the motivating-factor jury instruction in 
the employer retaliation context. Finally, we propose a possible 
solution for the burden-of-proof  conundrum, as well as offer 
avenues for further productive empirical research in this area.
Employer Retaliation
Retaliation cases have more than doubled in the last twenty 
years, and there are now more retaliation claims than any other 
cause of  action relating to employment discrimination.13 As 
most employers know and employees come to understand, em-
ployees may not file discrimination charges in federal court with-
out first filing such charges with either the Equal Employment 
9 See: Sherwyn & Heise, supra, at 930. 
10 See: Sherwyn & Heise, supra, at 926–47.
11 Sherwyn & Heise, supra, at 937, Table 5.
12 See infra: Section IV.
13 “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
After a series of  Court cases and the Civil Rights Act 
of  1991, the law was clear: it is unlawful for sex, race, color, 
national origin, and religion to even motivate employment deci-
sions, but motivation without the “but-for” cause—in which the 
discriminatory factor was the final straw that made a difference 
in the employer’s action—was not unlawful in age cases. 1 These 
rulings left open the question with regard to disability and retali-
ation. In University of  Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,2 
the Court held that retaliation is equated with age and implied 
disability and so should be treated similarly.3 That is, while some 
level of  employer discrimination based on age, disability, or 
retaliation is tolerated, no amount of  employer discrimination 
based on the five other statutory protected classes is permitted. 
Within weeks of  the Nassar holding, a bipartisan group 
of  lawmakers re-introduced parallel bills in the U.S. House of  
Representatives and the Senate, called the Protecting Older 
Workers against Discrimination Act (POWADA).4 POWADA 
would expand the so-called mixed-motive jury instruction to age, 
retaliation, and disability, and would allow plaintiffs, not judges, 
to decide which types of  instruction the jury would receive.5 
The argument in favor of  supporting POWADA is that there is 
no reason to distinguish Title VII from the ADEA, ADA, and 
retaliation. 
The difference is operationalized in two types of  jury 
instructions: (1) the “pretext,” or “but-for” instruction, and (2) 
the “mixed-motive” or “motivating-factor” instruction.6 Under 
the pretext instruction, juries are asked whether the employer 
would have made the decision “but for” the employee’s protect-
ed class. The mixed-motive jury instruction is a two prong test: 
(1) did the protected class motivate the employer; and (2) if  so, 
would the employer have made the decision regardless of  the 
protected class? The mixed-motive instruction arose out of  the 
Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision.7 The Civil 
Rights Act of  1991 codified the mixed-motive jury instruction, 
made it significantly more plaintiff friendly, and, for all intents 
and purposes, expanded its use so that mixed motive is now a 
misnomer and should be called “motivating-factor” instruction.8 
1 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
2 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
3 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532–33.
4 H.R. 2852, 113th. Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
5 Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
6 See, generally: David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, “The Gross Beast 
of  Burden of  Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of  Proof  
Influences Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes,” 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 901, 
905–915 (2010). 
7 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
8 Civil Rights Act of  1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 2 
(1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008)) (“[T]he decision of  
the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (2011) has 
weakened the scope and effectiveness of  Federal civil rights protections.”).
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or an affiliated state agency, 
commonly referred to as Fair Employment Practices Agencies 
(FEPA).14 As a result, tracking the percentages of  claims alleging 
violations of  anti-discrimination employment statutes may be 
accomplished by analyzing EEOC or FEPA charge filing statis-
tics. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the EEOC and state FEPAs 
received about the same number of  charges each year.15 FEPA 
charge data are often difficult to find and may be incomplete. 
EEOC data, by contrast, are readily available and are more 
likely to be complete. For this reason, we rely on EEOC data 
regarding enforcement of  Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and the 
Equal Pay Act. In the last twenty-one years, total employment 
discrimination charges filed with the EEOC have ranged from a 
low of  72,302 charges in 1992 to a high of  99,947 in 2011 (see 
Exhibit 1, overleaf).16 In 2015, 89,385 charges were filed.17 
Because of  this year-to-year fluctuation, using the raw 
numbers to evaluate which claims are most prevalent is not 
informative. Instead, we analyze the percentage change in 
claims filed per year. The largest single year-to-year percentage 
change occurred in Americans with Disabilities (ADA) claims 
filed in 1992 and 1993.18 Only 1.4 percent of  the cases filed in 
1992 were ADA cases, but that number exploded to 17.4 percent 
in 1993.19 This jump can be attributed to the ADA taking effect 
in July 1992.20 Beginning in 1993, the ADA cases have made up 
between 17.4 and 26.5 percent of  EEOC filings.21 Besides dis-
ability, the greatest fluctuation in any claim based on a protected 
class was the 7.2 percentage-point differential between ADEA 
cases filed in 1992 (27.1%) and the cases filed in 1995 (19.9 %).22 
In 2012, ADEA cases made up 23.0 percent of  the total claims 
14 “Filing a Charge of  Discrimination,” EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/employ-
ees/lawsuitcharge.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2014); “Filing a Lawsuit,” EEOC, 
www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
15 “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
16 “Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); 
and “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012,” EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
17 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Reports Nearly 100,000 Job Bias 
Charges in Fiscal Year 2012 (Jan. 28, 2013), available at www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/1-28-13.cfm.
18 “Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); 
and “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012,” EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
19“Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
20 Id.
21 “Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); 
and  “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
22 “Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); 
filed.23 These fluctuations may be the result of  random variabil-
ity, and, in any event, little in the way of  trends can be discerned 
in these statistics. There is, however, one cause of  action that 
exhibited a dramatic linear increase that is almost certainly non-
random—retaliation.
In 1993, retaliation claims made up 15.7 percent of  the 
total cases brought.24 By 2015, that percentage almost tripled 
to 44.5 percent.25 In 2009, both retaliation and race accounted 
for 36 percent of  the claims. Since 2010, retaliation cases have 
supplanted race as the most prevalent claim.26 Moreover, unlike 
any other category, percentages for retaliation did not rise and 
fall throughout the time period in question. Instead, except for 
a slight drop from 2001 to 2002 (27.5% to 27.0%), retaliation 
cases, as a percentage of  total cases filed, rose each year.27 
The increase in the percentage of  retaliation cases is not, as 
one would logically surmise, accompanied by a decrease in the 
percentages of  other employment discrimination claims. The 
reason that the percentages can exceed 100 is that a single em-
ployee can allege discrimination under more than one cause of  
action.28 For example, assume that a forty-five year old African-
American woman, who is Jewish and blind, files a charge against 
a potential employer who failed to hire her. Based on a single 
incident, this individual can allege discrimination based on age, 
race, sex, religion, and disability. Each theory of  discrimination 
would be tallied despite the fact that they arose from a single 
charge filed.
Between 1997 and 2012, the percentage of  “cases” rose 
from 145.6 percent to 170.3 percent. Over the same time period, 
the percentage of  retaliation cases rose 15.5 percent.29 A large 
portion of  the increase is likely fueled by what some refer to as 
“tack-on” cases. Retaliation tack-on cases are cases that allege 
a violation based on one of  the seven protected classes with a 
retaliation case “tacked on.” 
It should be noted that, according to EEOC data, the 
majority of  cases filed do not have merit. In the last 19 years, 
resolutions deemed meritorious by the EEOC have seen a high 
of  22.9 percent and a low of  11 percent. A chief  reason for the 
low percentage of  meritorious cases is that employers need to 
address meritorious cases by settling them. Indeed, most em-
and  “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
23 “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
24 “Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
25 “Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013,” EEOC, http://eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 For example in 2012 the total percentages of  claims were 170.1%. Id.
29 Id. 
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Exhibit 1a
EEOC charge statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2015 (part 1)
 FY 1997 FY 
1998 
FY 
1999 
FY 
2000 
FY 
2001 
FY 
2002 
FY 
2003 
FY 
2004 
FY 
2005 
FY 
2006 
Total 
Charges
80,680 79,591 77,444 79,896 80,840 84,442 81,293 79,432 75,428 75,768
Race 29,199 28,820 28,819 28,945 28,912 29,910 28,526 27,696 26,740 27,238
36.2% 36.2% 37.3% 36.2% 35.8% 35.4% 35.1% 34.9% 35.5% 35.9%
Sex 24,728 24,454 23,907 25,194 25,140 25,536 24,362 24,249 23,094 23,247
30.7% 30.7% 30.9% 31.5% 31.1% 30.2% 30.0% 30.5% 30.6% 30.7%
National 
Origin
6,712 6,778 7,108 7,792 8,025 9,046 8,450 8,361 8,035 8,327
8.3% 8.5% 9.2% 9.8% 9.9% 10.7% 10.4% 10.5% 10.7% 11.0%
Religion 1,709 1,786 1,811 1,939 2,127 2,572 2,532 2,466 2,340 2,541
2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.6% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.4%
Color 762 965 1,303 1,290 1,135 1,381 1,550 930 1,069 1,241
0.9% 1.2% 1.7% 1.6% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6%
Retaliation 
- All 
Statutes
18,198 19,114 19,694 21,613 22,257 22,768 22,690 22,740 22,278 22,555
22.6% 24.0% 25.4% 27.1% 27.5% 27.0% 27.9% 28.6% 29.5% 29.8%
Retaliation 
- Title VII 
only
16,394 17,246 17,883 19,753 20,407 20,814 20,615 20,240 19,429 19,560
20.3% 21.7% 23.1% 24.7% 25.2% 24.6% 25.4% 25.5% 25.8% 25.8%
Age 15,785 15,191 14,141 16,008 17,405 19,921 19,124 17,837 16,585 16,548
19.6% 19.1% 18.3% 20.0% 21.5% 23.6% 23.5% 22.5% 22.0% 21.8%
Disability 18,108 17,806 17,007 15,864 16,470 15,964 15,377 15,376 14,893 15,575
22.4% 22.4% 22.0% 19.9% 20.4% 18.9% 18.9% 19.4% 19.7% 20.6%
Equal Pay 
Act
1,134 1,071 1,044 1,270 1,251 1,256 1,167 1,011 970 861
1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.1%
GINA
system the courts design should, in an ideal world, result in non-
meritorious cases being dismissed and meritorious claims being 
found as such, with damages awarded. However, we contend 
that the risk of  losing a non-meritorious case increases when the 
plaintiff tacks on a retaliation claim. When a case is ripe, both 
sides use whatever weapons they have.
Tacking on additional claims to a complaint is relatively 
inexpensive. The obvious benefit of  tacking on claims is the cre-
ployers are risk-averse and their lawyers are even more so. Fear-
ing litigation costs, damages, and bad publicity, most employers 
will settle cases in which they are guilty, and their lawyers, who 
do not want to lose a case or a client, will push to settle non-
meritorious cases that have “bad facts.” 
On the other hand, non-meritorious cases leave employers 
in a quandary: (1) litigate and thus take on the often exorbitant 
cost of  defense while risking an adverse verdict by a runaway 
jury; or (2) settle the case despite the lack of  a violation. The 
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alleging retaliation may be more likely to be regarded as hav-
ing attempted to resolve a workplace problem without resort-
ing to the courts. Such behaviors may appear reasonable to a 
fact finder, and they may undermine the employer’s argument 
that the plaintiff is only attempting to extort money from an 
employer after the fact. 
On a more practical level, compared to discrimination, 
retaliation is easier for employees to identify and juries to un-
ation of  an additional basis from which to recover.30 As explained 
below, even if  the underlying claim fails, employees may nonethe-
less succeed on a retaliation claim. Retaliation claims may also 
augment the perceived legitimacy of  underlying claims. Plaintiffs 
30 Joan M. Savage, Note, “Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach 
to the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII 
Retaliation,” 46 B.C. L. Rev. 215, 219 & n.36 (2004) (“Retaliation charges serve 
as independent legal claims, which do not depend on the validity of  the underly-
ing claim.”). 
FY 
2007
FY 
2008
FY 
2009
FY 
2010
FY 2011 FY 
2012
FY 
2013
FY 
2014
FY 2015
82,792 95,402 93,277 99,922 99,947 99,412 93,727 88,778 89,385
30,510 33,937 33,579 35,890 35,395 33,512 33,068 31,073 31,027
37.0% 35.6% 36.0% 35.9% 35.4% 33.7% 35.3% 35.0% 34.7%
24,826 28,372 28,028 29,029 28,534 30,356 27,687 26,027 26,396
30.1% 29.7% 30.0% 29.1% 28.5% 30.5% 29.5% 29.3% 29.5%
9,396 10,601 11,134 11,304 11,833 10,883 10,642 9,579 9,438
11.4% 11.1% 11.9% 11.3% 11.8% 10.9% 11.4% 10.8% 10.6%
2,880 3,273 3,386 3,790 4,151 3,811 3,721 3,549 3,502
3.5% 3.4% 3.6% 3.8% 4.2% 3.8% 4.0% 4.0% 3.9%
1,735 2,698 2,943 2,780 2,832 2,662 3,146 2,756 2,833
2.1% 2.8% 3.2% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 3.4% 3.1% 3.2%
26,663 32,690 33,613 36,258 37,334 37,836 38,539 37,955 39,757
32.3% 34.3% 36.0% 36.3% 37.4% 38.1% 41.1% 42.8% 44.5%
23,371 28,698 28,948 30,948 31,429 31,208 31,478 30,771 31,893
28.3% 30.1% 31.0% 31.0% 31.4% 31.4% 33.6% 34.7% 35.7%
19,103 24,582 22,778 23,264 23,465 22,857 21,396 20,588 20,144
23.2% 25.8% 24.4% 23.3% 23.5% 23.0% 22.8% 23.2% 22.5%
17,734 19,453 21,451 25,165 25,742 26,379 25,957 25,369 26,968
21.4% 20.4% 23.0% 25.2% 25.8% 26.5% 27.7% 28.6% 30.2%
818 954 942 1,044 919 1,082 1,019 938 973
1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
Exhibit 1b
EEOC charge statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2015 (concluded)
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 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005
Receipts 80,680 79,591 77,444 79,896 80,840 84,442 81,293 79,432 75,428
Resolutions 106,312 101,470 97,846 93,672 90,106 95,222 87,755 85,259 77,352
Resolutions By Type
Settlements 3,992 4,646 6,094 7,937 7,330 8,425 8,401 8,665 8,116
 3.8% 4.6% 6.2% 8.5% 8.1% 8.8% 9.6% 10.2% 10.5%
Withdrawals w/Benefits 3,635 3,219 3,593 3,753 3,654 3,772 3,700 3,827 4,072
 3.4% 3.2% 3.7% 4.0% 4.1% 4.0% 4.2% 4.5% 5.3%
Administrative Closures 30,077 27,118 23,570 19,156 18,636 19,633 15,262 15,416 12,659
 28.3% 26.7% 24.1% 20.5% 20.7% 20.6% 17.4% 18.1% 16.4%
No Reasonable Cause 64,567 61,794 58,174 54,578 51,562 56,514 55,359 53,182 48,079
 60.7% 60.9% 59.5% 58.3% 57.2% 59.3% 63.1% 62.4% 62.2%
Reasonable Cause 4,041 4,693 6,415 8,248 8,924 6,878 5,033 4,169 4,426
 3.8% 4.6% 6.6% 8.8% 9.9% 7.2% 5.7% 4.9% 5.7%
Successful Conciliations 1,041 1,343 1,578 2,040 2,365 1,940 1,432 1,217 1,319
 1.0% 1.3% 1.6% 2.2% 2.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1.4% 1.7%
Unsuccessful Conciliations 3,000 3,350 4,837 6,208 6,559 4,938 3,601 2,952 3,107
 2.8% 3.3% 4.9% 6.6% 7.3% 5.2% 4.1% 3.5% 4.0%
Merit Resolutions 11,668 12,558 16,102 19,938 19,908 19,075 17,134 16,661 16,614
 11.0% 12.4% 16.5% 21.3% 22.1% 20.0% 19.5% 19.5% 21.5%
Monetary Benefits (Millions)* $176.7 $169.2 $210.5 $245.7 $247.8 $257.7 $236.2 $251.7 $271.6
Exhibit 2
EEOC charge outcomes, FY 1997 Through FY 2015 (part 1)
derstand.31 In contrast, discrimination can be subtle and difficult 
to interpret. Employees may wonder whether the employer is 
basing a decision on the employee’s protected class or because 
of  a personal dislike or other non-discriminatory reason. Retali-
ation, by definition, follows a complaint or another clear action,32 
and the employee consequently feels confident in the reason 
for adverse treatment. In addition, lawyers report that juries 
are often skeptical about discrimination.33 Without a “smoking 
gun” evidencing a specific employer action or pattern, it is often 
difficult to convince a jury that the employer’s negative feelings 
about a protected class were so strong that that the employer 
was willing to take a discriminatory action and thereby risk the 
time, money, and negative publicity associated with a discrimi-
nation lawsuit.34 This is especially true in discharge cases, in 
which it is often difficult for juries to accept that an employer 
31 See: B. Glenn George, “Revenge,” 83 Tul. L. Rev. 439, 469 (2008) 
(“Because the juror can more easily project his or her own revenge or retali-
ation instinct in a similar situation, he or she may more easily conclude that 
retaliation played a role in the adverse decision made.”).
32 “Retaliation,” EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 15 2014).
33 See: supra note 102.
34 See: supra note 102; see also: Norton et al., supra note 53, at 37–38 
(discussing why racial bias is a difficult thing to prove).
hired a member of  a protected class but then terminated the 
employee because of  being a member of  that very class. It may 
seem illogical for an employer to not discriminate at the time of  
hiring the plaintiff but then to discriminate at the time of  the 
employee’s discharge. 
Alternatively, people tend to more readily appreciate that 
employers (and their agents) may become upset and angry when 
being accused of  discrimination, whether falsely or fairly, and 
might therefore want to retaliate against the individualmaking 
those accusations. For these reasons, plaintiffs’ lawyers, acting 
as rational, self-interested actors who must decide whether to 
invest their time and money in each case with which they are 
presented, are often more interested in retaliation cases than 
other types of  discrimination cases, all else being equal.35 A case 
in which the employee can identify unlawful actions based on 
an easily understandable unlawful motivation is more attractive 
to most jury members.36 Finally, as explained below, when using 
the pretext standard, retaliation cases are easier to prove than 
traditional discrimination cases.
35 See: supra note 102.
36 See: George, supra note 139, at 469 (“Because the juror can more easily 
project his or her own revenge or retaliation instinct in a similar situation, he 
or she may more easily conclude that retaliation played a role in the adverse 
decision made.”). 
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FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015
75,768 82,792 95,402 93,277 99,922 99,947 99,412 93,727 88,778 89,385
74,308 72,442 81,081 85,980 104,999 112,499 111,139 97,252 87,442 92,641
8,500 8,834 8,831 8,634 9,777 10,234 9,524 8,625 7,411 8,221
11.4% 12.2% 10.9% 10.0% 9.3% 9.1% 8.6% 8.9% 8.5% 8.9%
4,052 4,122 4,790 4,892 5,391 5,689 5,438 5,497 5,162 5,301
5.5% 5.7% 5.9% 5.7% 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% 5.7% 5.9% 5.7%
12,298 12,865 16,615 16,189 17,330 18,053 16,459 15,456 14,748 15,440
16.6% 17.8% 20.5% 18.8% 16.5% 16.0% 14.8% 15.9% 16.9% 16.7%
45,500 42,979 47,152 52,363 67,520 74,198 75,511 64,159 57,376 60,440
61.2% 59.3% 58.2% 60.9% 64.3% 66.0% 67.9% 66.0% 65.6% 65.2%
3,958 3,642 3,693 3,902 4,981 4,325 4,207 3,515 2,745 3,239
5.3% 5.0% 4.6% 4.5% 4.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.6% 3.1% 3.5%
1,141 1,137 1,128 1,240 1,348 1,351 1,591 1,437 1,031 1,432
1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.4% 1.5% 1.2% 1.5%
2,817 2,505 2,565 2,662 3,633 2,974 2,616 2,078 1,714 1,807
3.8% 3.5% 3.2% 3.1% 3.5% 2.6% 2.4% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0%
16,510 16,598 17,314 17,428 20,149 20,248 19,169 17,637 15,318 16,761
22.2% 22.9% 21.4% 20.3% 19.2% 18.0% 17.2% 18.1% 17.5% 18.1%
$229.9 $290.6 $274.4 $294.2 $319.4 $364.7 $365.4 $372.1 $296.1 $356.6
Exhibit 2
EEOC charge outcomes, FY 1997 Through FY 2015 (concluded)
The Law of  Employer Retaliation
After Nassar, to establish a case of  retaliation under either clause, 
employees must prove that they engaged in a “protected activ-
ity,” that they were discriminated against, and that there is a 
link between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action.37 
A protected expression, for retaliation purposes, can occur 
under either the participation clause or the opposition clause.38 
An employee invokes the participation clause when he or she 
takes part (e.g., as a party or witness) in a Title VII, ADEA, or 
ADA proceeding (e.g., agency investigation or litigation).39 The 
opposition clause applies to situations in which an employee 
complains that the employer violated a discrimination law.40 The 
complaint did not come as part of  a discrimination proceeding 
and is instead based on an internal complaint, other notification 
to management, or even the filing of  a claim.41 Regardless of  
which applies, it is important to note that the discrimination at 
37 See: Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th 
Cir. 1998).
38 George, supra note 139, at 446–51.
39 George, supra note 139, at 446–47 & nn.27–30. 
40 George, supra note 139, at 447–50. 
41 George, supra note 139, at 447–51. 
issue does not have to involve the complaining employee.42 For 
example, a male employee who testifies at trial or complains 
to his employer that women are being sexually harassed has 
engaged in a protected expression under the participation or 
opposition clause. Still, what constitutes a protected expression 
is sometimes a challenging question.
In Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale and Retail Stores,43 the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the definition of  a protected expression in 
opposition clause cases. Employee Payne believed that his 
employer refused to hire people of  color into positions in which 
the employees would have to handle money.44 Payne, who was 
temporarily laid off each summer, joined a civil-rights group 
that picketed in front of  the employer’s store.45 After the picket-
ing occurred, the employer did not rehire Payne, who alleged 
retaliation under the opposition clause.46 The employer argued 
that because Payne’s allegations of  racial discrimination were 
42 George, supra note 139, at 447 (“[T]his protection extends not only 
to the employee who filed the complaint but also to anyone who testifies or 
otherwise participates in the investigation or hearing.”).
43 654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1981).
44 Id. at 1135–36.
45 Id.  at 1134–35. 
46 Id. at 1135. 
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unfounded, there could not be a protected expression.47 The 
employer asserted that employees could not succeed on a retali-
ation claim unless they proved that the underlying claim of  
employment discrimination did, in fact, occur.48 
In rejecting the employer’s argument, the court held that 
the employee engaged in a protected expression even if  the 
underlying claim failed and the employer had not, in fact, vio-
lated the law.49 Instead, the court explained, the employee need 
only have a good faith reasonable belief  that the subject of  the 
complaint was true.50 An expression is considered to be held in 
good faith if  the employee truly believes the alleged conduct oc-
curred.51 An employee has a reasonable belief  if  there is a basis 
on which to believe that the alleged conduct did occur, and if  
true, the conduct would violate the law.52
The participation clause protects an employee who par-
ticipates in any Title VII procedure regardless of  the extent of  
such participation.53 In fact, the EEOC guidelines state that 
protection under the participation clause applies to testifying, 
assisting, and preparing affidavits in conjunction with a proceed-
ing or investigation under Title VII, ADEA, ADA, or EPA.54 
These present broad parameters on which to base a claim. For 
instance, an employee who files an EEOC charge or who assists 
another in filing or preparing such a charge qualifies as being 
in a protected class. This is the case even if  the charge is not 
true, not reasonable, or not even brought in good faith.55 As the 
Second Circuit noted in Deravin v. Kerik, the participation clause 
“is expansive and seemingly contains no limitations.”56 No case 
47 Id. at 1137. 
48 Id.
49 Payne, 654 F.2d at 1137.
50 See: Id. at 1140; and note 11. 
51 See, e.g.: Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 
(11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of  retaliation 
under the opposition clause of  Title VII if  he shows that he had a good faith, 
reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment 
practices. ... A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in 
good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment 
practices, but also that his belief  was objectively reasonable in light of  the 
facts and record presented.”). The court referred to a good faith belief  as one 
that is “honest and bona fide.” Id. 
52 Payne, 654 F.2d at 1140–41. Payne reasonably believed McLemore’s 
hiring and promotional practices violated Title VII. Id. at 1141. The minority 
position requires the plaintiff to hold a good-faith belief  that the employer 
violated the law. See: Ficus v. Triumph Grp. Operations, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 
1241 (D. Kan. 1998). 
53 EEOC, Directives Transmittal, EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. 2 
§ 8-II(C)(1), 8-8–8-9, available at: www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf.
54 Id. at 8-2.
55 See, e.g.: Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (“The participation clause...has accordingly been interpreted as 
shielding recourse to the EEOC, regardless of  the ultimate resolution of  the 
underlying claim on its merits.”). 
56 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003).
illustrates this point more clearly than Merritt v. Dillard Paper Com-
pany.57 There, the Eleventh Circuit held that a company could 
not discharge an employee for his admitted sexual harassment 
when the admission occurred as part of  testimony proffered in 
a Title VII case.58 Since the employee was testifying in a Title 
VII case, the content of  the testimony was protected and could 
not be the basis for a termination decision even though Merritt 
admitted violating company policy and the law. 
The application of  the opposition and participation clauses 
makes sense: not requiring an opposing plaintiff to prove the 
truth of  the underlying claim prevents the chilling effect of  
possible dismissal for speaking up. If  employees are protected 
only when they can prove that their employer violated the law, 
employees will be reluctant to use company harassment poli-
cies or otherwise complain about discrimination. Because the 
Supreme Court, numerous lower courts, and commentators 
consistently contend that the key to ending discrimination is em-
ployee complaints followed by swift employer action, this chilling 
effect needs to be curbed.59 Similarly, employees should not fear 
participating in EEOC investigations or litigation because of  
their perceptions that unlawful employer activity may not consti-
tute violations of  the discrimination law and they could thus be 
terminated for such testimony. The competing incentives make 
it difficult to craft bright-line parameters that toe the line in 
this area without tipping the balance and yielding undesirable 
results in either direction.
The Supreme Court’s Characterization of  Employer 
Retaliation
In the five years prior to Nassar, the Supreme Court issued three 
“employee friendly” retaliation decisions that made it easier for 
employees to prove retaliation. What makes these cases relevant 
to the discussion here is that in two of  the cases the Supreme 
Court expanded retaliation to include types of  harm and classes 
of  plaintiffs not protected in other statutes. In Burlington Northern 
& Santa Fe Railway Company v. White,60 the Court held that, un-
like the other protected classes, a plaintiff in a retaliation case 
did not have to suffer an adverse employment action.61 Instead, 
an employee simply had to prove that the employer’s response 
to a complaint of  discrimination was one that would dissuade a 
57 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997).
58 Id. at 1182.
59 See, e.g.: Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]
he company’s response was both swift and appropriate. After hearing the 
plaintiff’s complaint, [the company’s chief  executive and owner] immediately 
looked into it, concluded that the misconduct had occurred, and reprimanded 
[the plaintiff’s coworkers] in very strong terms.).
60 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
61 Id. at 67–70.
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reasonable person from complaining in the future.62 The theory 
underwriting the ruling seemed to accord with the principle 
that the best way to eradicate discrimination is to encourage 
employees to complain and, further, that most impediments to 
such ability to complain would undermine this goal and should 
therefore be considered unlawful retaliation.63 After Burlington 
Northern, allegations of  retaliation included conduct such as 
receiving the “cold shoulder” (being ignored),64 a poor perfor-
mance evaluation,65 and issuance of  a performance improve-
ment plan.66 The Court’s decisions, taken together, imply that 
retaliation is different from the other protected classes.
In Thompson v. North American Stainless,67 the Court took the 
application of  this principle one step further by holding that a 
retaliation plaintiff need not even engage in a protected expres-
sion.68 In Thompson, the employer terminated the complaining 
employee’s fiancé.69 The Court applied the so-called “zone of  
interest” protection under which a complaining employee’s 
fiancé (and, we presume, spouse) is protected from retaliation.70 
Whether this logic similarly extends to siblings, parents, children, 
boyfriends, girlfriends, best friends, roommates, or other rela-
tionships will likely form the basis of  litigation. By expanding 
the definition of  protected expression and discrimination, the 
retaliation trilogy—Burlington Northern, Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government,71 and Thompson—made retaliation claims even 
more attractive to plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers because both 
stand-alone and tack-on retaliation cases are significantly easier 
to get to a jury. Again, these cases stand for the principle that 
retaliation is different than other forms of  unlawful employment 
discrimination. 
Why Retaliation Claims Are Different 
Similar to the Supreme Court, we also contend that retaliation 
differs from other causes of  employment discrimination actions, 
for two key reasons. First, a truly innocent employer can not 
62 Id. (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training 
lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advance-
ment might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about 
discrimination”).
63 See: Id. 
64 Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010).
65 Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
66 Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
67 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
68 Id. at 870. (“We know of  no other context in which the words carry 
this artificially narrow meaning.”). 
69 Id. at 867. 
70 Id. at 870.
71 In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t., 555 U.S. 271 (2009), the third Supreme 
Court retaliation case, the Court held that an employee who, during an in-
house investigation, stated that she had seen sexual harassment was opposing 
discrimination, despite the fact that she never complained and did not express 
any horror or even disgust. 
only have its business and reputation destroyed, but the law 
also forces the employer to continue to employ the person who 
seriously damaged the company. An examination of  the Payne 
case illustrates this point.72 Assume for the sake of  illustration 
that Payne’s allegation was false, even though Payne believed it 
to be true. Assume further that the employer in Payne offered the 
money-related job in question to its two most senior employees, 
both of  whom were individuals of  color. Assume that the two 
employees of  color turned down the job. The employer is disap-
pointed but believed it was the employees’ decision to make and 
thus offered the position to the third-most-senior employee, a 
white employee, who accepts the job. Payne, however, has no 
way of  knowing how the hiring decision was made. Instead, 
Payne observes no people of  color in positions in which em-
ployees handle money and jumps to a logical, albeit erroneous, 
conclusion that the two most senior employees, both of  whom 
were African American, were passed over for the open position 
in favor of  a white employee. Payne notifies the company and 
the EEOC of  his belief  that the employer violated the law (thus 
activating the opposition clause). The EEOC investigates and 
soon the local newspaper publishes a front-page story about the 
investigation. A protest ensues outside the employer’s front door, 
and people hold signs accusing the employer of  being a racist. 
Online media pick up the story too. The employer’s business 
suffers, the owners’ standing in the community is diminished, 
and the owners’ families are attacked due to the false accusation. 
Furious at being maligned, the owners do not wish to continue 
to employ the individual whose false accusations caused all of  
this pain and suffering. They could not tolerate continuing to 
pay someone whose judgment they did not trust and someone 
whom they feel stabbed the company in the back.
The owners want to terminate the employee but do not do 
so because the law prohibits it. Several months after the com-
plaint and the accompanying fallout, employee Payne violates 
company policy by providing his company discount to a friend. 
The company has a strict policy of  terminating employees who 
engage in such action and can prove that it has terminated 
several other employees who engaged in such conduct but had 
never complained about discrimination and were not part of  
the same protected class as Payne. At trial the plaintiff’s attorney 
asks one of  the company’s owners if  the accusation of  discrimi-
nation angered her and whether she was relieved to have Payne 
off the payroll. Regardless of  how she answers, given the facts, 
we propose that most juries would infer that the owner was 
angry and is now relieved. In fact, we contend that even if  there 
was little fall out, most employers would not wish to continue to 
employ an individual who accused the company of  reprehen-
sible behavior, and thus, would be relieved at the opportunity to 
legitimately terminate such an individual’s employment. This 
is a perfect cross-examination question because no matter how 
72 See: supra notes 151–66 and accompanying discussion.
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the witness responds, the case is made for the plaintiff. Either 
the jury will believe that the witness is lying if  she says that she 
harbored no ill will towards Payne for accusing her of  being a 
racist because that seems so implausible, or if  the witness says 
she did harbor ill will towards Payne, the jury will think that the 
witness admitted having a retaliatory motive. This illustrates 
our central point that retaliation claims are different than other 
employment discrimination claims. No analogous Scylla and 
Charybdis cross-examination question like this one exists in 
other discrimination contexts; however, it is not clear whether 
and to what extent the hypothetical juror reaction posited here 
is empirically valid.
It is likely that jurors will be quicker to infer retaliation than 
other protected classifications as motivating employer conduct. 
This is because, as human beings, most people can relate to 
being motivated to retaliate against someone who wrongs you. 
That instinct likely predates the Bible73 and may be a part of  
innate human nature across cultures.74 This obviously cannot 
be said of  other motives for discrimination. Particularly, as some 
have come to regard racial discrimination as becoming less 
prevalent, it is even more likely that individuals will be slower 
to impute racial motives to employer actions in the absence of  
direct evidence of  discrimination.75 If  a white employer failed 
to promote a Hispanic employee, how frequently would a jury 
infer that discrimination was a motivating factor? Conversely, all 
things equal, if  an employer failed to promote an employee who 
complained that other employees were being racially discrimi-
nated and sexually harassed, how much more or less frequently 
would a jury infer that retaliation was a motivating factor? 
Keeping the facts almost identical, this is what we sought to find 
out by repeating the 2010 mock jury study but modifying the 
national original fact pattern used in 2010 to a claim of  unlaw-
ful retaliation. Before discussing the results from our 2013 retali-
ation study, we briefly describe our prior national origin study.
Experimental Evidence of  the Impact of  Burdens 
of  Proof  on Juror Decision Making
Do employees alleging retaliation fare better at trial than em-
ployees alleging discrimination based on other protected classes? 
General methodological limits and problems specific to jury 
instruction research limit our ability to answer this question as 
73 See: Christopher Boehm, “Retaliatory Violence in Human Prehis-
tory,” 51 Brit. J. Criminology 518 (2011).
74 See, e.g.: Simon Gächter & Benedikt Herrmann, “Reciprocity, Cul-
ture and Human Cooperation: Previous Insights and a New Cross-Cultural 
Experiment,” 364 Phil. Transactions of  the Royal Soc’y: Biological Sci. 791 (2009); 
and Karl Sigmund, “Punish or Perish? Retaliation and Collaboration among 
Humans,” 22 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 593 (2007); see also: Janice Nadler & 
Mary R. Rose, “Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of  Punish-
ment,” 88 Cornell L. Rev. 419 (2003) (discussing the retributive psychology of  
punishment and experimentally testing this in a laboratory setting). 
75 See: Jonathon Hunyor, Skin-deep: Proof  and Inferences of  Racial 
Discrimination in Employment, 25 Sydney L. Rev. 535, 551–54 (2003). 
definitively as we would like. First, selection bias lurks, as not all 
litigated legal cases are reported,76 and the stream of  cases that 
are reported is non-random.77 Second, the overwhelming major-
ity of  cases settle and, increasingly, settlements are confidential.78 
Third, even if  all employment discrimination lawsuits went to 
trial (did not settle) and generated published legal opinions, the 
factual, legal, and contextual variations across cases complicate 
efforts to generalize.
Our prior research focused on whether the “motivating-
factor” versus the “but-for” jury instruction influences case 
outcomes.79 Using an experimental mock jury research design, 
our results demonstrated how jury instruction variations in the 
employment discrimination context can inform case outcomes.80 
Assuming facts that could support the claim as much as deny 
it, employers have a substantially equal chance of  prevailing in 
pretext and motivating-factor cases, but we found a “non-trivial 
chance that a motivating-factor instruction will result in costs 
and fees being awarded.”81 Consequently, we suggested that em-
ployers are better off with a pretext instruction than a motivat-
ing factor instruction.82
To be sure, the finding that differing burdens of  proof  
generate different results does not by itself  imply a problem. If  
legitimate rationales support different proof  burdens, different 
results would not only be acceptable, they would be desirable. In 
fact, as an economic matter, burdens of  proof  should be con-
structed in civil litigation this way.83 Regrettably, however, this 
is not the case. After Costa and prior to Gross, there was no clear 
standard as to when courts would apply the motivating factor in-
struction and not the pretext instruction. After Gross and Nassar, 
this problem remains in Title VII cases. POWADA endeavors to 
76 See: Ruth Colker, “Winning and Losing Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,” 62 Ohio St. L.J. 239, 246 (2001) (“The most important caveat 
that emerges from these [methodological] considerations is that appellate 
investigations in the employment discrimination area reflect a selection bias.”)
77 For example, the U.S. Courts of  Appeals publish opinions only selec-
tively, and the circuits follow different rules regarding unpublished opinions. 
Ruth Colker, “The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defen-
dants,” 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 104–05 (1999) (noting the problems 
of  statistical representation inherent in empirical analysis of  appellate court 
decisions); see also: Colker, supra note 184, at 244–47.
78 The few exceptions include settlement agreements for class actions, 
claims filed by a governmental plaintiff, such as the EEOC, and, in some states, 
claims against a governmental defendant regarding public records. See Scott 
A. Moss, “Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of  Confidential 
Settlements,” 105 Mich. L. Rev. 867, 869–70 & nn.3–17 (2007).
79 See: Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11 at 931–44. 
80 Id.
81 Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11 at 937.
82 Id. at 937–38 (“Both [the motivating factor without the affirmative 
defense option and the full motivating factor option]...are less desirable than 
the pretext jury instruction for employers.”).
83 Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, “Burdens of  Proof  in Civil Litiga-
tion: An Economic Perspective,” 26 J. Legal Stud. 413, 418–22 (1997).
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provide equity for all protected classes by overturning Gross and 
Nassar and allowing employees to select their preferred method 
of  proof  in all discrimination cases.84 While the statute solves 
the problem of  judicial inconsistency (i.e., judges deciding when 
to allow the motivating-factor instruction or not) and statutory 
inconsistency (that is, treating age and disability differently than 
the other five protected classes), there are three problems that 
the statute either does not address or exacerbates. First, should 
jurors unwittingly award thousands of  dollars in costs and fees to 
plaintiffs? Second, should employers that render legitimate busi-
ness decisions be penalized for perceived illegitimate motivations? 
In other words, should Congress penalize an employer if  a jury 
(correctly or incorrectly) infers motivation based on the decision 
maker’s race, sex, or religion but agrees that the decision would 
have been made regardless of  the protected class? The third ques-
tion—and the focus of  this study—involves whether retaliation 
should be included with other protected classes when it comes 
to the motivating factor jury instructions. Below, we posit that it 
should not.
Experimental Mock Jury Studies
We selected an experimental research design with a mock jury 
as the best available methodology to address the empirical chal-
lenges noted above. Although mock jury studies are increasingly 
common in legal scholarship, the method warrants a brief  
discussion. Mock jury studies endeavor to gain the benefits of  
experimental research (such as manipulating key variables) while 
minimizing problems of  ecological validity.85 When reviewing 
mock jury research, researchers have noted a variety of  issues 
in which mock jury experiments were instrumental—juror char-
acteristics, the effects of  prejudicial pretrial news coverage, the 
use of  impermissible information, jurors’ ability to understand 
standards of  proof  and instructions on the law, and deliberation 
phenomena, to name a few.86 Two experiments are described in 
detail below to illustrate the process.
Mock jury experiments provide important advantages 
over post-trial jury interviews and quantitative analyses of  trial 
84 See: Appendix B
85 See, generally: David De Cremer and Daan Van Knipperberg, “How 
Do Leaders Promote Cooperation? The Effects of  Charisma and Procedural 
Fairness,” 87 J. Applied Psychol. 858 (2002) [Attribution Error: Does not discuss 
mock jury studies]; Robert J. MacCoun, “Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real 
and Mock, Amateur and Professional,” 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 511 (2005); and 
Shari Seidman Diamond, “Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations,” 
21 Law & Hum. Behav. 561 (1997). 
86 See: Shari Seidman Diamond et al., “Juror Judgments About Liability 
and Damages: Sources of  Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency,” 48 
DePaul L. Rev. 301 (1999); and Michael J. Saks, “What Do Jury Experiments 
Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?,” 6 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 
1, 9–44 (1997). Mock jury studies have also been used to lend insight on 
important questions of  how well decision makers understand certain kinds of  
evidence commonly presented to jurors. See, e.g.: D.H. Kaye and Jonathan J. 
Koehler, “Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?,” 154 J. Royal Stat. 
Soc’y 75 (1991). 
outcomes. Notably, the ability to change one variable at a time 
permits researchers to gain a purchase on mechanisms and 
relations among variables that are often otherwise unobserv-
able using other empirical methodologies.87 Nonetheless, the 
experimental approach is not without important limitations, 
mostly with the consequence of  reduced external validity. Stan-
dard problems include the following: (1) mock jurors are often 
students rather than a more representative general population 
sample; (2) facts are presented in writing or by video or audio 
recording rather than through a live trial; (3) verdicts lack real-
world consequences; and most often (4) there is no group (jury 
room) deliberation.88
The degree to which student mock jurors attenuate exter-
nal validity is unclear. For example, studies examining the use 
of  students have found “little or no difference in…verdicts by 
student and adult jury-eligible respondents for the same cases.”89 
A meta-analysis of  twenty years of  jury simulations found 
no conclusive differences between student and non-student 
participants.90 Where infrequent differences arose, students dem-
onstrated a slight preference against criminal conviction and for 
defendant civil liability.91
Jury Instruction Studies of  Employment 
Discrimination 
In an effort to enhance external validity, our experiment used 
case statements constructed (and used) by experienced employ-
ment discrimination specialists at a leading New York City 
law firm.92 Before describing our experimental design, we first 
describe the jury instructions and special verdict sheets used in 
our study.
One problem with studying jury instructions is the varia-
tion in real-world jury instructions used by judges. In some juris-
dictions, judges are permitted to develop their own proprietary 
jury instructions, as long as they accord with settled law. Judges 
typically ask each party to draft proposed jury instructions and 
then choose one of  the two proposals or draft a third version 
themselves. Other jurisdictions have established model jury in-
87 Seidman Diamond et al., supra note 194, at 302–03; and Samuel R. 
Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “How Much Do We Really Know About 
Race and Juries? A Review of  Social Science Theory and Research,” 78 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 997, 1002–03 (2003). 
88 See: Saks, supra note 194, at 7.
89 Robert J. MacCoun, “Experimental Research on Jury Decision-
Making,” 244 Sci. 1046, 1046 (1989).
90 Brian H. Bornstein, “The Ecological Validity of  Jury Simulations: Is 
the Jury Still Out?,” 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 75, 77–80 (1999). 
91 Id. at 80.
92 Founded in 1875, Proskauer, Rose LLP is a full-service law firm with 
offices in New York, New Jersey, Florida, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, New 
Orleans, Washington D.C., and throughout the world. Proskauer, “About Us,” 
www.proskauer.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 1. 2014). 
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structions that are routinely employed.93 These jury instructions 
are accompanied by “special jury verdict sheets.” This study 
exploits sample discrimination jury instructions and special ver-
dict sheets that the Northern District of  Illinois made publicly 
available. Appendix A contains the jury instructions and special 
verdict sheets used in this study.94
Experimental Evidence on Employer Retaliation
We argue that disability and age should fall under the same 
standard as sex, race, color, national origin, and religion,95 but 
we contend that retaliation is different. Since most discrimina-
tion cases are discharge cases, there is a strong argument that 
the protected class is irrelevant, or at least less relevant. We 
begin from the truism that a company may not discharge an 
employee who is a member of  a protected class (e.g., gender, 
race, or religious group) without having hired this employee 
in the first instance. So, before any additional facts are added, 
on its face, it is difficult to explain why an employer would 
offer employment to an employee in a protected class at some 
expense, risking liability, and then take an adverse employment 
action against that person with animus against him because of  
the protected class some time later. At least, one may say that 
the logic may seem inconsistent and the explanation for the ad-
verse employment action may not be obvious on its face. Such 
logic, of  course, has critical limitations. For example, the actors 
making hiring decisions are not necessarily those responsible for 
the subsequent employment actions, or certain protected groups 
could be judged under different standards. Still, absent evidence 
to support the plaintiff, it seems unlikely that juries will more 
often than not presume that the protected class “motivated” the 
employer. 
93 See, e.g.: Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no 
error in the trial court’s determination that an applicable Arkansas Model Jury 
Instruction stated Arkansas law correctly); Gatlin v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 
481 S.W. 2d 338, 340–41 (Ark. 1972) (finding error where the trial court sub-
stituted its own instruction for an applicable Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 
without stating the basis for refusal); Irwin v. Omar Bakeries, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 700, 
704–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (finding no error where the trial court did not use 
a specific Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction that the court determined was inap-
plicable); Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W. 2d 780, 786–87 (Mo. 1977) 
(finding no error where the trial court modified the Missouri Approved Jury 
Instruction to apply it to the case facts); and Anderson v. Welsh, 527 P.2d 1079, 
1086–87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (finding non-prejudicial error where the trial 
court gave not only the applicable Uniform Jury Instruction but additional 
inapplicable Uniform Jury Instructions). 
94 Fed. Civ. Jury Instructions of  the Seventh Cir., § 3.01 & cmt. c (Comm. on 
Pattern Civ. Jury Instructions of  the Seventh Cir., Draft, Oct. 2004), available 
at http://web.archive.org/web/20050120184720/www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
Rules/pjury_civil_draft.pdf. 
95 See, generally: Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11. 
Conversely, we propose that a person terminated or denied 
a promotion after making a complaint of  discrimination is in a 
different position. Retaliation plaintiffs’ status changes during 
employment. By engaging in protected expression, such plain-
tiffs land in a protected class they were not in upon hire. In such 
a context, we suggest the possibility that juries will likely find 
that retaliation motivated the employer. Results from our study 
support this suggestion.
To substantiate our hypothesis, we needed to compare 
retaliation against a Title VII allegation. In our 2010 study we 
used a national origin case and tested the effects of  the differ-
ent jury instructions on findings of  the participants. In the 2013 
study, we used a retaliation case instead of  a national origin case. 
To do this we altered the name of  the plaintiff so that it sounded 
more similar (or familiar) to the decision makers (employer). 
We also slightly modified the fact pattern so that the plaintiff, a 
senior employee, engaged in a protected expression by accusing 
a supervisor of  sexually harassing and racially discriminating 
against employees. We, of  course, also altered the jury instruc-
tions and the special jury verdict sheet to reflect the employee’s 
retaliation claim. 
Since we were comparing the two studies, we needed to 
to enhance replicability and thus, our current study otherwise 
matches our past study. In both studies, the subjects were Cor-
nell University undergraduate students, with the vast majority 
enrolled in a management program. The statement of  the case 
was delivered by associates from a New York City law firm, and 
the subjects reviewed the materials under conditions similar to 
the prior study. This time, however, we did not vary the kind 
of  jury instructions that the subjects reviewed. Instead, all par-
ticipants received the motivating-factor instruction. Below, we 
discuss the key results of  the two studies. 
The Experiment
Senior litigation associates from Proskauer Rose’s New York 
City office developed a standard employment discrimination 
scenario in which a plaintiff alleged that his employer retaliated 
against him by denying him a promotion for complaining about 
sexual harassment and racial discrimination in the workplace. 
One hundred twenty-eight Cornell University undergradu-
ate students, mostly from the School of  Hotel Administration, 
served as mock jurors. All subjects received an identical presen-
tation of  the case statement. At two different times, participants 
watched the case statements on large video screens in a lecture 
hall. We showed the plaintiff’s statement first and then immedi-
ately showed the defendant’s statement. Subjects were then pro-
vided a motivating factor jury instruction. After hearing the jury 
instructions, participants were randomly assigned into groups 
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Results and Discussion
More than 59 percent of  the jurors agreed that the plaintiff 
(employee) successfully established that retaliation due to the 
plaintiff’s complaints about sexual and racial discrimination in 
the workplace was a motivating factor in the employer’s failure 
to promote the plaintiff (see Exhibit 4). The difference between 
jurors’ yes (76) and no (52) votes is statistically significant.97 
Moreover, only 9.3 percent (12/128) of  jurors found that the 
employer failed to prove that it would have made the same 
decision regardless of  retaliation (see Exhibits 4 and 6). Overall, 
our results, while merely descriptive and experimental, illustrate 
how the two-question motivating-factor instruction results in 
97 p = 0.041 (two-tailed binominal distribution test).
Exhibit 3
Respondents’ summary statistics
% (N)
All Respondents 128
Gender: 94
Female 54.3
Race or Ethnicity: 92
White 68.5
Non-White 31.5
 Hispanic 1.1
 Mixed 9.8
 Asian 18.5
 Black 1.1
 [other] 1.1
Annual Family Income: 93
$50K or less 5.4
$51K–$100K 9.7
$101K–$150K 9.7
$151K–$200K 14.0
$201K–$250K 10.8
More than $250K 50.5
Prior work experience 98.9 93
Interaction: 93
 White-highest income 35.5
Exhibit 4
Subjects’ jury verdicts: Plaintiff established 
retaliation claim
Yes No Sig. (N)
Total 76 52 * 128
Gender:
 Female 23 28 51
 Male 26 17 43
Race:
 White 30 33 63
 Non-white 17 12 29
Family Income:
 Less than $250K 24 22 46
 More than $250K 24 23 47
Interactions:
 White–highest 
income
16 17 33
 Non-white–
highest income
32 28 60
 
 Note: * p < 0.05.
of  six and provided special jury verdict sheets. They were given 
twenty minutes to deliberate. After concluding their delibera-
tions, subjects were asked to fill out individual verdict forms.96
As shown in Exhibit 3, just over one-half  of  the respon-
dents were women. Most were white, and the majority of  the 
remaining students were Asian. Moreover, just over one-half  of  
the subjects came from households in which reported annual 
family income exceeded $250,000. White subjects from homes 
with the highest annual family income (in excess of  $250,000) 
constituted 35.5 percent of  the respondent panel.
96 To minimize underreporting and esteem-based influences, the experi-
ment was conducted in a large auditorium classroom. Special jury verdict 
forms were completed anonymously.
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the majority of  jurors awarding the plaintiff attorneys’ fees and 
litigation costs even when the jurors believe that the plaintiff did 
not deserve damages.
Just to be sure that jurors’ background characteristics did 
not inform their assessment of  the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, 
our statistical tests found that respondents’ gender, race, and 
family income had no statistically significantly association with 
juror decision rendering. We grant that an assessment of  various 
juror sub-pools reduces statistical power, but it is still worth ad-
dressing this issue.
To provide additional context, we compared our main 
result in Exhibit 4 with results from prior research on a similar, 
though distinct, issue. Over a two-year period in the early 2000s 
we ran a similar experiment drawing from the same pool of  
subjects (undergraduate students attending Cornell University) 
that focused on an employee’s claim that national origin dis-
crimination was the reason that his employer failed to promote 
the plaintiff.98 In that study, jurors were provided with either: 
(1) the full motivating-factor jury instruction and special jury 
verdict sheet; (2) the motivating-factor instruction without the 
second question (i.e., the employer’s affirmative defense that 
it would have made the same decision regardless of  national 
origin); or (3) the so-called “but-for” jury instruction and special 
verdict jury sheet. The purpose of  that study was to determine 
whether the different instructions affected outcomes. We found 
that there was no statistically significant difference between the 
full motivating-factor instruction and the “but-for” instruction 
when it came to the ultimate question of  whether the employee 
was entitled to damages. We did find, however, that there 
was a significant difference between the first question in the 
98 See: Sherwyn & Heise, supra notes 6 and 11.
motivating-factor special jury verdict sheet and the one and only 
“but-for” question. Because answering the first question in the 
motivating-factor scheme results in costs and fees, the difference 
was not only statistically different, but it also carried important 
practical legal consequences.
In the study presented here, we explored whether simply 
changing the employment discrimination claim from national 
origin to retaliation would influence juror results. By replicating 
the general nature of  the factual case and using a similar panel 
of  respondents, we sought to control the influence of  salient 
background variables. On the ultimate question of  whether the 
employee was entitled to damages, we did not expect a major 
change in how jurors ruled. Results on the employee damages 
question generally corresponded to our expectations. While the 
percentage of  jurors awarding full damages to the complaining 
employee increased (from 6.3 percent to 9.3 percent), such an 
increase strikes us as de minimus (though suggestive). Insofar as 
we feel the underlying nature of  employee retaliation claims 
fundamentally differs from that of  national origin claims, we 
expected to find different juror outcomes. Results from our two 
studies comport with these expectations.
We compare the two separate studies in Exhibit 5, which 
illustrates the important difference regarding how the mock ju-
rors answered the motivating-factor question. In 2010, just over 
40 percent of  the mock jurors concluded that the employee suc-
cessfully established that discrimination based on national origin 
motivated the employer. In 2013, however, almost 60 percent of  
the mock jurors concluded that the employee established that re-
taliation motivated the employer. While it is true that a few years 
separate these two experiments, there is little, if  any, reason to 
expect that students drawn from the same underlying popula-
tion would behave differently in the two experiments. We are 
unaware of  any material changes in terms of  the composition 
of  Cornell University undergraduates over these years. Rather, 
differences in the nature of  the employment discrimination 
claims (national origin versus retaliation) more likely account for 
the increase in jurors concluding that the complaining employee 
successfully established its legal claim (from 40.1 percent to 59.4 
percent).
We excused the fifty-two mock jurors who concluded that 
the plaintiff failed to establish that retaliation was a motivat-
ing factor, but we had another question for the remaining 
seventy-six respondents, who had concluded that the plaintiff 
successfully established that retaliation motivated the employer. 
This second question asked whether the defendant (employer) 
successfully established that its decision not to promote the 
employee was made independently of  the employee’s sexual and 
racial workplace harassment claims. As the results in Exhibit 6 
make clear, sixty-four of  these seventy-six jurors agreed with the 
employer’s claim that the firm would have made the same deci-
sion regardless of  retaliation. Similar to the results in question 1, 
Exhibit 5
Subjects’ jury verdicts (part 1): Plaintiff 
established employment discrimination claim
(1)
National Origin
(2010)
(2)
Retaliation
(2013)
Yes 40.1% 59.4%
No 59.9% 40.6%
(N) 142 128
 Notes: Values in column 1 derive from our 2010 study of jury 
instructions’ influence in a national origin employment discrimination 
claim. Values in column 2 come from row 1 in Exhibit 4.  
Source: David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, “The Gross Beast of Burden of 
Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences 
Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes,” 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 901, 905–
915 (2010)..
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the difference between jurors’ “yes” and “no” votes in question 
2 is statistically significant.99 Again, similar to the results in ques-
tion 1, none of  the respondents’ demographic characteristics 
shows a statistically significantly association with their decision.
We note that one might expect this panel of  mock jurors 
to side with management, due to their personal situation. 
Insofar as all but one of  our respondents already benefit from 
employment experience and all are enrolled in a management 
preparation program, one could argue that our sample drawn 
from a population of  undergraduate students might represent 
a relatively traditional management perspective. Moreover, 
while the experienced New York City employment lawyers who 
drafted the factual scenario used in both of  our studies attempt-
ed to make the case a legal close call, they had represented the 
employer in the actual case and thus had developed and lived 
with the employer’s strategies and theories of  the case. Thus, it 
is likely that both the sample of  mock jurors and the source of  
the scenario would be predisposed to side with management. 
Despite a likely net bias favoring the employer, however, almost 
60 percent of  our jurors awarded either full damages or at least 
costs and fees to the employee.
These results reinforce the three concerns articulated above. 
First, employers are penalized for their thoughts, not their ac-
tions. An employer who would not have promoted the hypothet-
ical plaintiff regardless of  his complaints is still found liable for 
costs and fees. Congress determined that even being motivated 
by race, sex, color, religion, or national origin is unlawful and 
worthy of  declaratory judgment, as well as costs and fees. It 
seems that Congress wants to create a world in which these 
protected characteristics do not even cross an employer’s mind. 
This is a laudable goal, and we agree that the world would be a 
better place if  this lack of  prejudice became standard behavior. 
However, we contend that this is not the case in retaliation. 
As noted above, retaliation is a biologically engrained human 
response to negative stimuli. Is it reasonable to suggest that hu-
mans have evolved to the point where a plaintiff’s good faith and 
reasonable, but false, accusation of  reprehensible behavior (like 
sexual harassment or racial discrimination) will not factor into a 
decision maker’s motives? Is this a goal that we should pursue so 
that those who do not let such actions be a “but-for” cause, but 
who do let it play a role in a decision, are guilty of  discrimina-
tion and need to suffer financial and social consequences?
A second issue is that the jury does not know that check-
ing a jury verdict-sheet box for a motivating factor means that 
the employer will pay costs and fees, which can greatly exceed 
any theoretical back pay. In fact, several students remarked that 
“yes/yes = no.” In terms of  damages, it does. Thus, this kind of  
special jury verdict sheet can functionally mislead jurors. This 
is particularly problematic given the likely way in which jurors 
endogenously consider damage awards with their determination 
99 p < 0.001 (two-tailed binominal distribution test).
of  the merits of  a case. For instance, Hans and Reyna posit that 
jurors first make a categorical “gist judgment” that money dam-
ages are warranted and then make an ordinal judgment ranking 
the damages deserved as low, medium, or high.100 If  this is the 
case, the findings in this study are even more problematic.101 
This issue is not limited to retaliation, but our third con-
cern shows that retaliation exacerbates the problem. In the 2010 
study, 40 percent of  the mock jurors found that national origin 
motivated the employer.102 With an almost identical fact pattern, 
the 2013 study saw an increase to 60 percent of  the mock jurors 
finding that retaliation motivated the employer. In addition, 50 
percent of  the mock jurors found that even though retaliation 
motivated the employer, it would have made the same decision 
regardless. In our 2010 study, only 34 percent of  the jurors ruled 
100 Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, “To Dollars from Sense: Quali-
tative to Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards,” 8 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 120, 120 (2011).
101 Another recent article suggests that this result is problematic 
because it belies the extent to which fact-finders try to establish “the truth, 
rather than a statistical surrogate of  the truth, while securing the appropriate 
allocation of  the risk of  error.” Ronald J. Allen and Alex Stein, “Evidence, 
Probability, and the Burden of  Proof,” 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 557, 557–602 (2013).
102 Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11, at 934, Table 1.
Exhibit 6
Subjects’ jury verdicts (part 2): Defendant 
established no plaintiff promotion despite 
plaintiff discrimination claim
Yes No Sig. (N)
Total 64 12 ** 76
Gender
 Female 17 6 23
 Male 24 2 26
Race:
 White 27 3 30
 Non-white 12 5 17
Family Income:
 Less than $250K 19 5 24
 More than $250K 21 3 24
Interactions:
 White–highest 
income
15 1 16
 Non-white–highest 
income
25 7 32
  
Note: ** p < 0.01.
18  Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor and Employment Law • The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University
the same way.103 The stark contrast in these numbers supports 
our contention that retaliation differs in important ways from 
other protected employee classes. The fact that our sample 
of  mock jurors likely skews in a direction that favors employ-
ers only deepens the concerns. If  POWADA passes, it seems 
highly likely that the vast majority of  retaliation plaintiffs will 
successfully obtain costs and fees—at the very least. If  so, this 
should stimulate employee retaliation claims, particularly from 
employees uneasy with their job security. By pushing retaliation 
claims, employees can strategically exploit employers’ aversion 
to increased legal uncertainty and exposure. Moreover, this 
might also prompt judges to look more favorably on employers’ 
summary judgment motions owing to fears—real or perceived—
about cost and fee awards. Judges may also increasingly deny 
costs and fees despite jury findings. 
In reality, employers faced with retaliation claims will settle 
a greater percentage of  cases and for higher amounts. These 
settlements will, in turn, fuel further litigation. To dampen 
the likely tide of  retaliation claims, employers could reduce 
avenues to complain of  discrimination, as such complaints will 
be too costly, or seek to create a more homogeneous workforce 
in which complaints will carry less weight. Fewer complaints 
and an incentive to avoid diversity will perpetuate discrimina-
tion. This is an admittedly pessimistic vision of  an unfortunate 
vicious cycle.
Conclusion: Start Making Sense
We suggest three fixes to the challenges outlined above flow-
ing from POWADA’s proposal to extend the mixed-motive 
jury instruction in employer retaliation discrimination cases. 
First, Congress could return to the Price Waterhouse holding and 
not award costs and fees for motivations that do not pass the 
“but-for” causation test. This is a value judgment of  whether 
motivations that do not really affect employers’ decisions should 
be unlawful. If  so, should the plaintiffs’ lawyers be compensated 
for bringing cases in which protected categories form non-deter-
minative motivations in adverse employment actions? Second, 
juries should be informed that checking the motivating-factor 
103 Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11, at 934, and Tables 1 & 2.
box will lead to awarding plaintiffs costs and fees. At least then 
jurors will be aware of  the consequences of  their decisions. That 
approach raises an important policy concern, however. That is 
whether decision makers should be aware of  the monetary con-
sequences of  their fact finding determination, or whether they 
should assess facts without knowing the ramifications of  their 
finding, and leave to judges the consequences of  those findings. 
The third option is to simply accept that retaliation is equal, but 
that some kinds of  employment claims are less equal than others 
and to exclude it from POWADA.
While we contend that either of  the first two steps would 
resolve the problems we have identified, neither is necessary. To 
begin with, smoking-gun evidence supporting discrimination 
claims is less common now. It is difficult to prove discrimina-
tion, and thus, the motivating-factor scheme provides plaintiffs a 
reasonable chance to prevail in their complaints. This is not the 
case with retaliation, however. The motivating-factor scheme 
will unduly increase the prospects for costs and fees awarded 
employees. Even now, employment lawyers warn employers not 
to try to “save” a struggling employee.104 Once the employee 
receives a performance improvement plan, the employee knows 
it is time to file a claim and buy six to eight months of  fear-
based employment.105 This occurs when the employer fears the 
costs of  termination more than the costs of  an unproductive or 
disruptive employee. From a social standpoint, this not a positive 
development, because people often need coaching in how to 
perform a job. POWADA would further discourage employers 
to help poor performing employees (rather than simply dismiss 
them). The potential negatives outweigh the benefit of  penal-
izing employers for retaliatory impulses.
In sum, we propose that the categories of  age and disability 
be treated like all other protected classes. There is neither a 
statutory nor logical basis to distinguish age and disability from 
other traditionally protected employee classes. In contrast, 
employer retaliation is different and, as such, should be treated 
differently by employment discrimination doctrine. n
104 Gregg A. Gilman, Partner, Davis & Gilbert LLP, Remarks at 6th 
Annual HR in Hospitality Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada (Mar. 2013). 
105 Id.
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Appendix A
Special Verdict Sheet:
_______________________________________X
Dennis Ferguson,
    Plaintiff,
 – against –     SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
ROCHESTER DAILY NEWS, INC.,
    Defendant.
______________________________________X
1. Did plaintiff Dennis Ferguson establish by a preponderance of the evidence that retaliation for his complaints of 
sexual harassment and racial discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision by defendant, Rochester Daily News, 
Inc., not to offer him a promotion in December 2009? 
  Yes ____ No ____
You should answer the next question only if you answered “yes” to Question 1. If you answered Question 1 “no,” you 
should not answer any further questions but sign this special verdict form and return the form to the clerk. 
2. Did defendant establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff 
the same way even if retaliation for plaintiff’s complaints of sexual harassment and racial discrimination had not played 
any role in the employment decision? 
  Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, sign the special verdict form on the last page. If you answered “no” to Question 2, 
plaintiff is entitled to recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the total amount of back pay to be 
awarded to plaintiff is $75,000. Check the box below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $75,000 and 
then sign the special verdict form. 
Plaintiff is entitled to back pay in the amount of $75,000. _____ 
SIGNED:
Please answer the following questions:
1. Gender: M F
2. Race / National Origin:
3. Have you worked for an employer?: Y N
4. Family Income:
a. Under $50,000
b. $51,000-$100,000
c. $101,000-150,000
d. $151-$200,000
e. $201,000-$250,000
f. over $250,000
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Appendix B
Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, 
H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). Full text:
Section 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the “Protecting Older Workers 
Against Discrimination Act”.
Sec. 2. Findings and Purpose.
(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:
(1) In enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, Congress intended to eliminate discrimination against 
individuals in the workplace based on age.
(2) In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress correctly 
recognized that unlawful discrimination is often difficult to 
detect and prove because discriminators do not usually admit 
their discrimination and often try to conceal their true motives.
(3) Congress has relied on a long line of court cases holding 
that language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, and similar antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws, that 
is nearly identical to language in title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 would be interpreted consistently with judicial 
interpretations of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), has eroded this long-held understanding 
of consistent interpretation and circumvented well-established 
precedents.
(4) The holding of the Supreme Court in Gross, by requiring 
proof that age was the “but for” cause of employment 
discrimination, has narrowed the scope of protection intended 
to be afforded by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom 
Congress intended to protect.
(5) The Supreme Court’s holding in Gross, relying on 
misconceptions about the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 articulated in prior decisions of the Court, has 
significantly narrowed the broad scope of the protections of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
(6) Unless Congress takes action, victims of age discrimination 
will find it unduly difficult to prove their claims and victims of 
other types of discrimination may find their rights and remedies 
uncertain and unpredictable.
(b) Purpose.—The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the 
standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the 
standard for making such a proof under title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.
Sec. 3. Standard of Proof.
Section 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(29 U.S.C. 623) is amended by adding after subsection (f) the 
following:
“(g)(1) For any claim brought under this Act or any other 
authority described in paragraph (5), a plaintiff establishes an 
unlawful employment practice if the plaintiff demonstrates by a 
preponderance of the evidence that—
“(A) an impermissible factor under that Act or authority was a 
motivating factor for the practice complained of, even if other 
factors also motivated that practice; or
“(B) the practice complained of would not have occurred in the 
absence of an impermissible factor.
“(2) On a claim in which a plaintiff demonstrates a violation 
under paragraph (1)(A) and a defendant demonstrates that the 
defendant would have taken the same action in the absence of 
the impermissible motivating factor, the court—
“(A) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as 
provided in subparagraph (B)), and attorney’s fees and costs 
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of 
a claim under paragraph (1); and
“(B) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any 
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.
“(3) In making the demonstration required by paragraph (1), a 
plaintiff may rely on any type or form of admissible 
circumstantial or direct evidence and need only produce 
evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude 
that a violation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
paragraph (1) occurred.
“(4) Every method for proving either such violation, including the 
evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), shall be available to the plaintiff.
“(5) This subsection shall apply to any claim that the practice 
complained of was motivated by a reason that is impermissible, 
with regard to that practice, under—
“(A) this Act, including subsection (d);
“(B) any Federal law forbidding employment discrimination;
“(C) any law forbidding discrimination of the type described in 
subsection (d) or forbidding other retaliation against an 
individual for engaging in, or interference with, any federally 
protected activity including the exercise of any right 
established by Federal law (including a whistleblower law); or
“(D) any provision of the Constitution that protects against 
discrimination or retaliation.
“(6) This subsection shall not apply to a claim under a law 
described in paragraph (5)(C) to the extent such law has an 
express provision regarding the legal burdens of proof 
applicable to that claim.
“(7) In any proceeding, with respect to a claim described in 
paragraph (5), the plaintiff need not plead the existence of this 
subsection.
“(8) In this subsection, the term ‘demonstrates’ means meet the 
burdens of production and persuasion.”.
Sec. 4. Application.
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply to 
all claims described in section 4(g)(4) of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 623(g)(4)) pending on or 
after June 17, 2009.
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